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1. INTRODUCTION
In the past 15 years, the creation of national monitoring mechanisms has been the most 
widespread advance in protecting people deprived of their liberty from torture and 
ill-treatment. Bodies that make monitoring visits to prisons are not new, but they have 
been extensively promoted through the Optional Protocol to the United Nations Conven-
tion Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment – 
the OPCAT. This treaty came into force in 2006 and Georgia was one of the first states to 
create the required national preventive mechanism (NPM), in 2009. 
This year, 2019, marks the tenth anniversary of the creation of Georgia’s NPM, which is a 
suitable moment to reflect on the achievements of this institution. We were asked to con-
duct this assessment on the strength of our multi-country study, Does Torture Prevention 
Work?, published in 2016.1 In that research, which included Georgia among the 16 coun-
try case studies,2 we concluded that the most important preventive measures against 
torture were effective safeguards in practice when persons are first taken into detention. 
Criminalization, investigation and prosecution of perpetrators of torture and ill-treatment 
was also very important. The work of independent monitoring bodies also had a discern-
ible positive impact – and this is particularly true in Georgia. So, while we concluded that 
monitoring bodies such as NPMs were not the most impactful mechanism for preventing 
torture, they are nevertheless an important part of the overall architecture of torture 
prevention. Indeed, it may be that they can play a significant role in encouraging states 
to provide more effective protection when people are first deprived of liberty – through 
access to a lawyer, medical examinations, and family notification among other steps – as 
well as advocating the more thorough and efficacious investigation and prosecution of 
torturers. This study of the Georgian NPM is an opportunity to look further into these 
questions.3
In order to conduct this research, we used two assessment tools developed out of previ-
ous research projects. One, derived from our multi-country study, measures the state of 
a country’s preventive mechanisms across detention safeguards, prosecution, monitor-
ing, and non-judicial complaints bodies. It considers both the legal framework and actual 
practice in each of these four sets of preventive mechanisms. The other, derived from 
work for the United Nations Development Programme, is a tool for determining an NPM’s 
compliance with the Paris Principles.4 We devised a conceptual model that links together 
1 Richard Carver and Lisa Handley, Does Torture Prevention Work? (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press), 
2016. The research for this original project was funded by the Association for the Prevention of Torture.
2 The researchers who wrote that chapter were Bakar Jikia and Moris Shalikashvili. We are very grateful to 
them for work that provided the foundation for this further study.
3 We are grateful to the Open Society Georgia Foundation for their financial support for this research; to the 
staff of the NPM for their patient responses to our inquiries; and to all those who agreed to be interviewed. 
4 Principles relating to the status and functioning of national institutions for protection and promotion of 
human rights (endorsed by UN Commission for Human Rights Res 1992/54 and UNGA Res A/RES/48/134 20 
December 1993).
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the capacity of the NPM to do its work and its actual work product with the short-term 
and long-term impact of the institution on torture reduction in Georgia.  Our evaluation 
model relies in part on these assessment tools to explain the effectiveness of the NPM.
For reasons of time, we focused only on three types of institutions that fall within the 
remit of the NPM: police stations and temporary detention isolators; and psychiatric hos-
pitals.5
5 The data that we needed to arrive at scores for these assessment tools was gathered in three ways. First, 
it rested in part on the research conducted in our earlier project. Secondly, it was based on documentary 
research, including NPM reports, legal texts, and reports of other organizations – national, regional, and in-
ternational. Thirdly, we conducted a two-week mission to Georgia in August 2019, visiting Tbilisi, Kutaisi, and 
Batumi, where we conducted more than 20 interviews with people from the NPM and PDO, governmental 




Our assessment of the Georgian NPM and its impact rests on a conceptual model that 
considers both process (the operations of the NPM) and outcome – the short-term and 
long-term impact of the NPM on torture prevention.  
Figure	1:	Conceptual	Model	for	Evaluating	NPM
The first component of the evaluation model displayed in Figure 1 is to assess the inde-
pendence, resources and general capacity of the NPM to do its work – that is, does it have 
the “inputs” required to carry out its work effectively?  In assessing this, we rely in part on 
a tool we devised, referred to as Resource, Independence and Pluralism Evaluation (RIPE), 
which evaluates compliance of the NPM with standards contained in the Paris Principles. 
We then consider the actual work of the NPM: How frequently does it visit closed insti-
tutions? Are these visits unannounced?  Are interviews of detainees conducted and are 
these private? Are reports of the NPM’s findings published? A portion of this segment of 
the assessment rests on the Assessment Tool for Evaluating Mechanisms for Preventing 
Torture (ATEMPT), which we developed based on our multi-country torture prevention 
study discussed below.  These “inputs” and “outputs” are the portion of the conceptual 
framework referred to as “process.”
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The second component of the conceptual framework in Figure 1 is “outcomes” in which 
we consider both the short-term and the long-term outcomes of the work of the NPM.  In 
the short-term, the effects of the NPM are best assessed by reviewing the recommenda-
tions it has put forward and whether these recommendations have been implemented. 
Of course, in the long-term, the goal of these recommendations is to reduce torture and 
ill-treatment.    We use ATEMPT to assess the overall effectiveness of NPM monitoring, 
compared to other torture prevention mechanisms, in reducing torture and ill-treatment 
in Georgia.
2.2. ATEMPT
The protection of people deprived of their liberty against torture and ill-treatment is one 
of the strongest norms in international law. This is true not only in the sense that this 
protection can never be derogated from or limited, but also because international law 
prescribes a far longer list of protections than for any other right. The United Nations 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment requires the criminalization, investigation and prosecution of the crime of torture. 
Its Optional Protocol requires states parties to open the doors of their prisons and deten-
tion centres to an international monitoring body, the Sub-Committee on Prevention of 
Torture, as well as creating national preventive mechanisms as independent monitoring 
institutions. Similar provisions exist at the regional level, notably the European Conven-
tion for the Prevention of Torture. The international promotion of national human rights 
institutions has led to the proliferation of non-judicial complaints mechanisms, seen by 
many as an important part of torture prevention. And various non-binding internation-
al instruments, notably the United Nations Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment and the Nelson Mandela Rules,6 
establish important standards and procedural guarantees, many of them given stronger 
expression in the jurisprudence of the regional human rights courts, especially in Europe. 
So, the legal protection against torture is exceptionally strong. But does any of it actually 
work?
A few years ago, the Association for the Prevention of Torture approached us with precise-
ly this question, having in turn been asked it by one of their long-standing financial sup-
porters. The result, after four years of work by more than 20 researchers in 16 countries 
was a book entitled Does Torture Prevention Work? The question that it sought to answer 
was simply: do the various preventive measures required by international law or the rec-
ommendations of human rights bodies have the claimed effect? Do they actually prevent 
torture? The answer to this was a qualified yes. Anti-torture campaigners and interna-
tional lawyers had not, by and large, been wasting their time. Most of the requirements 
of international law with regard to torture did have a positive effect in the 16 countries 
that we studied.
6  The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.
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However, the most interesting aspect of our findings was that the order of priority assigned 
by many anti-torture campaigners may not have been correct. We grouped anti-torture 
measures into four broad categories. The first was investigation and prosecution of tor-
turers (as required by the UNCAT). The second was the establishment of independent 
monitoring bodies at a national level, and granting access to international and regional 
monitoring bodies (as required by the OPCAT). The third was the establishment of non-ju-
dicial complaints mechanisms (as recommended by the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture and strongly promoted by various UN bodies). The fourth was the 
various procedural guarantees that should be in place when a person is taken into custody 
(as recommended, but somewhat weakly, by the UN Body of Principles). It turned out that 
it was the fourth of these, the least strongly entrenched in international law, that was by 
some distance the most important in protecting against torture. Prosecution of torturers 
was also important and the establishment of independent monitoring mechanisms had 
a discernible positive impact. Independent non-judicial complaints mechanisms did not 
have a detectible effect in preventing torture in the countries that we studied.
Our other principal finding also has significant implications. For each of our four groups of 
preventive mechanisms – detention, prosecution, monitoring and complaints – we looked 
both at how far each measure existed in law, but also whether it was fully implemented in 
practice. We found very clearly that there was a wide gap between law and practice, espe-
cially with regard to detention safeguards and prosecutions – the two most effective sets 
of preventive measures. Indeed, we saw that adopting any of these preventive measures 
in law had no effect in reducing the incidence of torture; this only happens when they are 
implemented in practice. Of course, enacting prevention into law is usually (though not 
invariably) a necessary precursor to implementing prevention in practice.  Table 1, below, 
provides an example of some of the preventive mechanisms we considered by cluster.
Table	1:	Examples	of	preventive	measures	by	cluster
Law Practice
Detention • Unofficial detention 
illegal
• Notification of family 
required
• Right to lawyer 
• Prompt presentation 
before judge required
• Medical exam required
• Is unofficial detention 
employed?
• Are families notified 
promptly? 
• Is right to lawyer conveyed 
and exercised? 
• Is presentation before judge 
prompt?
DOES THE GEORGIAN NPM WORK?10
Prosecution • Criminalization of 
torture
• Substantial penalties for 
torture
• Independent authority 
to investigate allegations
• Are allegations of torture 
brought?
• Are allegations thoroughly 
investigated?
• Are charges being brought 
in court?
• Are conviction rates 
comparable to other serious 
crimes?
Complaints • Independent complaints 
mechanism 
• Power to compel 
evidence and witnesses
• Power to refer complaint 
to investigative authority
• Are complaints investigated 
effectively?
• Are complaints referred to 
investigative authority (e.g., 
prosecution)?
• Are redress 
recommendations made?
Monitoring • Domestic monitoring 
mechanism
• Power to make 
unannounced visits
• Power to conduct 
interviews with 
detainees
• Does monitor conduct 
regular and unannounced 
visits?
• Does monitor interview 
detainees?
• Are monitors sanctioned for 
their activities?
Within our four groups of preventive mechanisms, it was also possible to identify which 
specific safeguards were most important. Among the most important was that people are 
only held in official, recorded detention; that members of their family or another person 
are promptly notified of their detention; that they are informed and exercise their right to 
a lawyer promptly after arrest; and that they receive an independent medical examination 
in custody. More broadly, criminal justice systems that rely more on alternatives to confes-
sion evidence are likely to lead to reduced torture. 
With regard to the prosecution of torturers, the most important step is that complaints 
of torture are actually lodged with the appropriate prosecutorial authority. The inference 
here is that very often victims of torture have no confidence in the system either to inves-
tigate properly or to protect them against further abuse. Allegations of torture need to 
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be fully and impartially investigated; conviction rates need to be comparable to those of 
other serious crimes; and there must be no amnesty or pardons for torturers.
The most important element of effective monitoring is the functional independence of 
the monitoring body – when monitors are free from threats or sanctions, then there is a 
higher correlation with reduced torture. 
Of course, monitoring bodies may have an important indirect impact in reducing torture 
and ill-treatment through the recommendations that they make to the authorities. If their 
recommendations correspond to the most important steps needed to prevent torture 
and ill-treatment – and if the recommendations are then implemented – they can be a 
valuable part of the preventive architecture. In other words, one would expect that NPM 
recommendations that had a serious impact would be largely strategic. They would not 
merely react to particular bad conditions that were observed, but propose laws, policies, 
and systems that would reduce the risk of torture and ill-treatment. 
Recommendations that seek to improve detention and prosecution laws and practices are 
relevant not only as potential short-term outcomes of the NPM, but also improve deten-
tion and prosecution practices, both of which play important roles in preventing torture 
and ill-treatment. (Hence, in our model, the arrows from recommendations point back to 
detention and prosecution, indicating their possible effect on detention and prosecution 
law and practice.) Limitations of time mean that it has not been possible to trace the 
implementation of every single recommendation generated by the Georgian NPM over a 
decade. However, it has been possible to develop an overall picture of the impact of NPM 
recommendations.
To research Does Torture Prevention Work? we used a combination of methods. We con-
ducted 16 qualitative case studies of countries over the period 1985 to 2014. In each 
country we looked at the incidence of torture and the various legal and policy steps tak-
en to prevent it. This was placed in the context of the political and social issues in each 
country to explain the drivers behind torture and ill-treatment, as well as the motivations 
or obstacles to preventive measures. However, our overall conclusions about the efficacy 
of prevention were drawn from a statistical analysis that measured the impact of vari-
ous preventive mechanisms on the incidence of torture. For each of our 16 countries we 
looked separately at each of the 30 years (1985-2014) and determined if the preventive 
mechanism was present (or partially present or absent).  We did this for a total of 66 
preventive measures grouped into the four clusters described above. We also did this for 
the dependent variable: the incidence of torture measured using a new scale called the 
Carver Handley Torture Score – CHATS.  
The statistical analysis allowed us to determine which preventive mechanisms were most 
effective at reducing torture.  We used this information to develop an assessment tool to 
evaluate a country’s anti-torture strategy. This is called the Assessment Tool for Evaluating 
Mechanisms for Preventing Torture (ATEMPT). Most assessment tools are simply a list of 
questions. An example of such a checklist is the assessment tool devised by the UN SPT for 
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evaluating national preventive mechanisms. For our list of questions, however, we have 
the advantage that we have already tested and drawn conclusions as to which answers 
matter more in reducing torture.  And we use this information to weigh those mecha-
nisms and clusters of mechanisms that have proved the most effective in reducing torture 
more heavily than those that are less effective. 
The ATEMPT questionnaire mirrors our codebook for the multi-country study.  It consists 
of 63 questions corresponding to 63 preventive mechanisms. The questions are divided 
into four categories – detention, prosecution, complaints, and monitoring – and each of 
these clusters are then further subdivided in turn into sections on law and practice. The 
monitoring portion is also divided between police detention and prisons. The questions 
are multiple choice, usually with three options (the preventive mechanism is wholly pres-
ent, partly present or wholly absent).  We have included a copy of the ATEMPT question-
naire as Appendix A.
Each question is scored depending on the answer and then weighted, depending on how 
important that particular mechanism has proven to be in preventing torture. The higher 
the correlation between the given mechanism and its role in reducing torture, the greater 
the weight assigned.
The weighted individual scores within each category are then tallied to produce a cluster 
score. In order to compare scores across categories/clusters, the scores are expressed as 
a percentage of the total points possible for each cluster. For example, the highest score 
possible for the detention cluster, when weighting is taken into account, is 78. If the de-
tention items tally to 43 for a given country, the score for that cluster would be 55.13% 
(since 43 is 55.13% of 78).
To produce an overall score, a second weight is then applied to each cluster score, de-
pending on the overall importance of the category in preventing torture. Again, the higher 
the correlation between the cluster and the reduction in torture, the greater the weight 
assigned. These four weighted cluster scores are then summed for the total score.   Coun-
tries will score higher when they put their efforts into achieving those measure that have 
been found to have the strongest impact on torture prevention.
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3. TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT IN GEORGIA BEFORE 
2009 
From the international perspective, Georgia is often viewed as a success story in torture 
prevention. Of course, this is a view that may not be shared either by those who are di-
rectly affected by the criminal justice or mental health systems, or by those who monitor 
it on a daily basis. It is helpful, then, to consider the history of torture and ill-treatment in 
Georgia, particularly since its re-emergence as an independent state. It is also important 
to identify the situation of torture prevention in the country just before the formation of 
the NPM to set a baseline for this study.
Soviet Georgia was marked by very poor conditions in police custody, prisons and psy-
chiatric hospitals, where deliberate ill-treatment was also rife. Police investigations con-
sisted, to a large extent, of beatings of suspects aimed at securing confessions. Politi-
cal dissidents in Georgia were likely to face similar deliberate ill-treatment or torture 
to those elsewhere in the Soviet Union, including incarceration in psychiatric hospitals 
and enforced medication. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the withdrawal of 
non-Georgian authorities, and civil war in Georgia led to a situation that was considerably 
worse than the late days of Soviet rule. There were widespread illegal detention, torture 
and extrajudicial execution in the early 1990s, and even once governmental power had 
been restored, torture persisted. In prisons, the main problem was poor conditions, exac-
erbated by increased overcrowding with growing prison populations from the mid-1990s. 
Prisoners were most at risk of violence from fellow inmates, because of the strength of 
Soviet criminal subcultures and informal hierarchies. Torture and deliberate ill-treatment 
were most likely to take place in police custody and pretrial detention. From the mid-
1990s, reports began to emerge of the widespread use of electric shock torture.
In 1994, Georgia ratified the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Various legislative and procedural reforms followed, 
aimed also at facilitating Georgia’s accession to the Council of Europe. These included 
judicial oversight over detention, procedural safeguards in the new criminal procedure 
code, and the creation of the Public Defender’s Office, with its complaints and monitoring 
functions. Another important reform was moving authority for the penitentiary system 
from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice. This was followed by a new 
practice from 2000, whereby prison authorities refused to allow the transfer of detainees 
from police custody if they had injuries that could have been caused by torture. While tor-
ture appears to have reduced in this period, it was far from eliminated, as the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) noted:
The allegations of ill-treatment related to both the time of apprehension and that of 
subsequent questioning by police officers. The types of ill-treatment alleged mainly 
concerned slaps, punches, kicks and blows struck with truncheons, gun butts and 
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other hard objects. The most serious allegations concerned the infliction of electric 
shocks, asphyxiation by using a gas mask, blows struck on the soles of the feet, and 
prolonged suspension of the body in an inverted position.7
After the Rose Revolution of 2003, the new government (and the PDO) set about address-
ing the problem of torture in police custody. One decisive change was the dismissal of 
80 percent of police officers, reorganizing the force away from the Soviet quasi-military 
model towards a modern democratic police service. The PDO conducted systematic and 
intense monitoring of police stations to determine whether procedures were being fol-
lowed and detainees being properly treated. Some unlawful detention outside formal 
custody continued, but the treatment of persons in police custody significantly improved 
by about 2006. Of equal importance, from 2006 detainees were required to be promptly 
removed after interrogation to special detention centres – temporary detention isolators 
– that were not under the control of the arresting police. There, detainees would be en-
titled to a medical examination on request. They would be held in the isolator until being 
presented before a judge. This separation of custody and investigation appears to have 
had a great positive impact.
During the same period, however, torture and ill-treatment in prisons were a growing 
problem. This was partly a result of overcrowding and very poor conditions, but it was 
also associated with the government’s tough anti-crime policies.
7  CPT report to the government of Georgia – 2001.
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4. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NPM IN GEORGIA
Georgia was one of the first countries to ratify the OPCAT and hence one of the first to 
be faced with the challenge of how to constitute a national preventive mechanism. After 
considering a variety of options,8 Georgia made the same decision as the overwhelming 
majority of parties to the OPCAT and designated its (internationally accredited) national 
human rights institution, the PDO, as the national preventive mechanism. This had var-
ious practical advantages: the PDO already had the required legal powers (although the 
Organic Law on the Public Defender was amended to make its new function explicit) and 
had been actively engaged in monitoring closed institutions for a number of years. Hence 
it had the necessary expertise – or at least as much as any Georgian institution had.
The revised Law on the Public Defender created a body called the Special Preventive 
Group, which encompassed both the staff of the NPM itself and a broader range of ex-
perts to be recruited and empowered to act as members of the NPM as required. In ad-
dition, an advisory council was created, comprised of members of civil society and oth-
er experts, which was intended to give broad strategic guidance to the NPM. However, 
despite this involvement of civil society organizations and external experts (as per the 
requirement that NPMs have regard to the Paris Principles), the Georgian NPM should not 
be seen as an “Ombudsman plus” model, since control of the mechanism rests entirely 
within the PDO.
The decision to adopt this model was made in 2008 – about a year after the formal dead-
line under the OPCAT – and the NPM became operational in 2009.
Initially responsibility for the functions of the NPM rested with the department already 
dealing with criminal justice and penitentiary matters, since this was where the expertise 
for monitoring visits rested. The number of personnel in this department was increased, 
but resources were still inevitably limited, since the department had responsibility not 
only for the preventive monitoring visits that it needed to undertake as NPM, but also 
the processing and consideration of large numbers of individual complaints from persons 
in police or prison custody. The recruitment of the Special Preventive Group (SPG) did, 
however, constitute a significant expansion of the PDO’s capacity, both in simple numbers 
available to conduct monitoring visits, but also in expertise. This was particularly appar-
ent in relation to disciplines such as medicine, not much in evidence within the PDO, but 
8  One population option, suggested by a number of NGOs with the support of the then Public Defender, was 
the creation of a National Council for Torture Prevention (NCTP), which would include representatives of all 
relevant government bodies as well as civil society. Under this proposal, the Public Defender would have 
been a member with equal voting rights and chairperson of the NCTP. The NCTP would have had several 
subordinate thematic/local bodies (commissions) in charge of monitoring prisons, police establishments, 
military detention units, children’s homes, psychiatric institutions, and homes for the elderly. A small NCTP 
secretariat would provide organizational and administrative support, probably located at the premises of the 
PDO. Other proposals included the creation of an Anti-Torture Departmental Council or the assignment of 
NPM functions to an existing body such as the Presidential Council on Penitentiary Institutions.
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available for hire through the SPG. This was important in relation to a key part of the 
NPM’s work – monitoring of psychiatric hospitals – but also in relation to evaluating prison 
healthcare, which has been a continuing priority over 10 years, and ensuring that the skills 
exist in the detention isolators and prisons to conduct forensic medical examinations to 
document allegations of torture or other ill-treatment.
4.1.	 Separation	of	monitoring	and	complaints	functions		  
For approximately the first half of the NPM’s life, preventive monitoring and complaints 
handling were functions of the same department. This is visible in the very high numbers 
of visits recorded in the period 2009-13, which dropped dramatically from 2014 onwards. 
The reason for this was not a change in the number of preventive visits, but the fact that 
the NPM no longer conducted visits to address individual cases. Under the old system, a 
half-hour meeting with a complainant, which would usually not even entail the NPM staff 
member entering the main part of the closed institution, would nevertheless count as a 
visit.
The view of the SPT, and the general consensus of commentators on NPMs, has been 
that these mechanisms should not be involved in individual case-handling, since they are 
“preventive” rather than “responsive.” This seems a little disingenuous at the theoretical 
level, since NPMs and other monitoring bodies of course publish evidence of torture or 
ill-treatment if they gather it. However, it seems to be generally accepted as a practical 
proposition that NPMs should not also be handling an individual caseload. In 2014, the 
policy and structure of the PDO changed to reflect this understanding, with a new crimi-
nal justice department responsible for handling complaints and for other matters relating 
to the criminal justice system that fell outside the NPM mandate. Of course, something 
was lost through this change. One of the arguments in favour of keeping the complaints 
and monitoring functions together is that information gathered through individual cases 
may be a way of identifying more systemic issues that can then be addressed through 
monitoring. Analysis of complaints may also tell the monitoring body whether its recom-
mendations have been complied with in practice. Interviewees within the NPM told us 
that communication between their department and the criminal justice department is 
good and frequent, so they still have the necessary information about complaints, which 
are automatically shared on the office computer network. The other consequence of this 
shift of responsibilities is that NPM staff cannot receive complaints in the course of their 
visits, but must refer inmates to the correct channels. Staff maintained that this caused no 
problems and that inmates understood the different functions of the two departments. 
We were unable to evaluate this claim. However, the NPM did clarify that in an extreme 
situation, they could act as courier to convey a complaint from a vulnerable person; they 
could also document photographic evidence of ill-treatment.
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In our interviews with outside actors, whether governmental or non-governmental, no 
one made any distinction between the NPM and the PDO. Indeed, all our questions were 
framed using the term “NPM” but were almost invariably answered with reference to the 
“PDO.” This is not to suggest that outsiders do not understand the distinct nature of the 
NPM function, but it is clear that the NPM is not seen as a different entity from the PDO. 
While there is potential for confusion, this is not a bad thing. When the NPM was assigned 
to the PDO, the office and its incumbents enjoyed considerable popular trust and a repu-
tation for being willing to challenge the authorities.9 This sort of public legitimacy can be 
immensely important to the credibility and impact of the NPM.
There may be overlaps between the work of the NPM and that of other arms of the PDO. 
For example, although the NPM does not handle complaints, this does not mean that 
the PDO does not do monitoring. A very positive example of this was described by a staff 
member of the PDO regional office in Batumi. He said that the office receives very few 
complaints relating to treatment in police custody, in contrast to inmates in the peniten-
tiary system. He conducts monitoring visits to police stations and temporary detention 
isolators, opening a complaint file if he identifies a breach of a suspect’s rights. This is 
part of a more general policy of conducting proactive visits to identify human rights vio-
lations in closed institutions, not only police facilities, that have not been the subject of 
a complaint. This is clearly a different process from that conducted by the NPM, but it 
supplements the NPM’s work in an important way. The NPM is entirely based within the 
national headquarters in Tbilisi. Between visits, the staff of the regional offices are the 
sole presence of the PDO. Given that the frequency of NPM visits to local police stations 
is going to be very low (though much higher for temporary detention isolators), this is an 
effective way of maintaining a monitoring presence at an important site of risk to persons 
deprived of their liberty. It was also striking that in our interview with Batumi police, they 
made no distinction between the NPM and the PDO.
4.2.	 Tension	between	the	NPM	and	the	Public	Defender	
If these are clear benefits from the decision to situate the NPM within the PDO, there have 
been other aspects of the relationship that have been more problematic. A decisive event 
in the NPM’s history took place at the end of 2013, when the recently appointed Public 
Defender, Ucha Nanuashvili, dismissed Natia Imnadze, the head of the NPM department, 
who had directed its operations since 2009, along with her deputy, Otar Kvatchadze. Ac-
cording to Imnadze, the reason for their dismissal was a press interview she had given in 
which she discussed the strength of criminal subcultures in the prisons and was critical of 
the Minister of Corrections and Legal Assistance, Sozar Subari (a former Public Defender). 
Sobari had himself been critical of a recommendation issued by the Public Defender on 
the issue of prisoners with tuberculosis. Nanuashvili stated that he dismissed the two 
9 See National Democratic Institute, Public Attitudes in Georgia: Results of July 2019 Survey, Tbilisi 2019, for 
evidence that the PDO retains considerable public confidence.
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because of intentional failure to perform duties, according to media reports. Imnadze and 
Kvatchadze sued the Public Defender for wrongful dismissal – a case that an administra-
tive court decided in their favour in 2019.
All but one of their colleagues resigned in protest, with the effect that the NPM more 
or less ceased to exist for several months until a new team could be appointed. The Eu-
ropean Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), which visited Georgia in 2014, 
expressed its concern about this turn of events in its mission report.10 The effect of this hi-
atus was essentially to impose a new start on the NPM. Continuity was provided by some 
members of the SPG, the external experts who continued to work on behalf of the NPM. 
Even so, much institutional memory had been lost with the departure of most staff, with 
existing records and procedures found to be inadequate. This was also the point when the 
decision was made to remove complaints-handling functions from the NPM. A new NPM 
team was built, led by Nika Kvaratskhelia, which has maintained a remarkable continuity 
up until the present. The existence of the SPG meant that the rupture in 2013-14 was 
less damaging than might have been the case. Many SPG members continued to work 
with the NPM throughout. Kvaratskhelia, the new head of the NPM, had himself been a 
member of the SPG, while at least one of the staff members who resigned in 2013 later 
returned as an SPG member. 
The dismissal of Imnadze and Kvatchadze, followed in effect by a conflict between the 
NPM staff and the Public Defender, raises a question about how we understand the notion 
of independence of an NPM when it is nested within another institution. Guarantees of 
the NPM’s independence in the OPCAT – and by implication in the Paris Principles – as-
sume that what is at issue is the autonomy of the entire institution in relation, primarily, 
to the executive branch. It does not address a situation where the operations of the mech-
anism may be impeded by the head of the institution as a whole, which they arguably 
were in this instance, given the court finding against the Public Defender’s decision. Our 
assessment tool, RIPE, is based upon the same normative framework and hence shares 
these assumptions. The reality is that the legal guarantees of independence attach to 
the institution as a whole and, in this instance, are embodied in the person of the Public 
Defender, who has extensive guarantees and immunities. Realistically, it is hard to envis-
age how the independence of employees of the institution might be equally entrenched, 
beyond the workings of administrative law, which in this instance did protect the rights 
of the affected staff. It should be noted that the subsequent law on public service of 2015 
extends the rights of public servants, including PDO staff.
In other areas, however, it may be possible to establish specific guarantees for the NPM, 
independently of the institution that hosts it. The most important of these is budget. 
There is still no separate and guaranteed budget for the NPM, voted by Parliament in-
dependently from the overall budget for the PDO. In practice, much of the operational 
budget of the NPM is in any case provided by one external funder, the European Union, 
10 Report to the Georgian Government on the visit to Georgia carried out by the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment from 1 to 11 December 2014, 
p.16.
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supplemented by project funding from other agencies. However, core costs come out of 
the PDO budget – ultimately state funds – and should arguably be protected so that the 
continuing operation of the NPM, which is an international treaty obligation of the Geor-
gian state, can be guaranteed. 
4.3.	 Relations	with	civil	society
Relationships with non-government organizations are managed in a number of ways, with 
the verdict from NGO personnel that we interviewed being generally positive, with one 
significant exception. One important means of engagement has been the hiring of experts 
from civil society organizations to be members of the Special Preventive Group. While 
they are not engaged there as representatives of their organizations, but are rather hired 
because of their personal expertise, this has been a way of keeping people from NGOs in 
dialogue with the NPM. 
More formally, NGOs participate in the NPM advisory council, which meets periodically to 
discuss the institution’s overall strategic direction. Initially these meetings were quarterly 
but are now much less frequent, which drew criticism from some our NGO interviewees. 
The statute of the advisory council was amended in 2019 to allow meetings to take place 
at a minimum of once every six months. The lesser frequency was because of members 
not attending regularly.
A third avenue for collaboration between the NPM and NGOs has been through joint 
projects, of which there have been successful examples with the Human Rights Centre, 
the Rehabilitation Initiative for Vulnerable Groups and Prison Reform International. In this 
model, NGO personnel are able to visit closed institutions with the NPM and separate 
reports are produced. The NPM benefits from the additional expertise, and new view-
point, of the NGO, while the latter obtains a level of access that would not otherwise be 
available.
Finally, there have been joint training events involving NPM and NGO staff, for example on 
conducting monitoring and on ethics.
However, several representatives of different NGOs strongly suggested that another, 
non-governmental monitoring body was required in addition to the NPM.
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5. EVALUATING THE INDEPENDENCE AND RESOURCES OF 
THE NPM: RIPE
We devised an assessment tool for evaluating the independence and resources of NPMs 
that we refer to as Resources, Independence, and Pluralism Evaluation, or RIPE.  It is based 
upon an effectiveness framework that we developed on behalf of the United Nations De-
velopment Programme for evaluating national human rights institutions.11 The original 
framework looked at the relationship between, on the one hand, various structural and 
legal attributes usually regarded as being important for NHRIs and mainly deriving from 
the Paris Principles, and, on the other hand, various important outputs. This is primarily 
a tool for assessing “first-order effectiveness” – that is to say, the activities and outputs 
of the institution, rather than the overall impact of the NHRI on society. We had to adapt 
this tool since it addresses itself to the attributes and activities of the NHRI. A national 
preventive mechanism is not, in itself, a national human rights institution, even though, 
like the Georgian NPM, it may be housed within an NHRI. Therefore, it does not have the 
full range of attributes and functions that an NHRI should have. However, the OPCAT does 
specify that states should give “due consideration” to the Paris Principles in creating na-
tional preventive mechanisms (Art. 18(4)). From the context, this primarily refers to the 
provisions of the Paris Principles relating to independence, pluralism and the need for 
adequate resources (Art. 18(1-3)).  
RIPE entails, in effect, a capacity assessment of the NPM, ranging from the legal frame-
work within which it was created, to the resources available to carry out its mandate. 
These resources are both material, including budget and hence numbers of staff, and 
human, including the skills and expertise contained within the NPM. RIPE also assesses 
the alliances that the NPM forges, some regarded as particularly important in the Paris 
Principles.  We used RIPE to essentially evaluate the “inputs” column of our conceptual 
model. This section summarizes our findings.
The first set of RIPE criteria relate to independence.
Statutory basis for the NPM
The PDO is the NPM. The Public Defender and the office that supports that person are 
established by law, amended in 2009 to explicitly recognize their function as the national 
preventive mechanism under the OPCAT. The Public Defender has constitutional status 
(Article 35), the highest possible basis of statutory protection, although the NPM as such 
does not. Of course, the fact that the NPM in everyday parlance is a department within 
the NPM means that it is possible for conflicts to occur between the department and the 
11 Richard Carver, Measuring the impact and development effectiveness of national human rights institutions: 
a proposed framework for evaluation (Bratislava: UNDP), 2014.
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Public Defender. As discussed, this possibility is not merely hypothetical. For the purposes 
of scoring RIPE, we consider the Public Defender, as she is the NPM in law, but note where 
answers differ with respect to the NPM department. Score 2/2.
Appointment process
The Public Defender is elected by Parliament. In formal terms, this process takes place 
entirely within the legislature, with no involvement of the general public in either nomi-
nating or choosing. In practice, selection of the Public Defender is widely reported in the 
media and involves consultation with relevant stakeholders, including political parties, 
citizens, NGOs, and other civil society groups
The head of the NPM department in the PDO is ultimately hired by the Public Defender, 
in the same sense as all PDO staff. In fact, the selection panel that appointed the current 
head of department was a mixed one, including outside participants, and recruitment 
committees may also involve NGOs and trade unions. Score 2/2.
Criteria for membership
The Organic Law on the Public Defender states only that the Public Defender shall be a 
citizen of Georgia. It does not require any particular expertise, such as prior knowledge 
of human rights. A full score would require that such criteria be set out by law. Member-
ship of the Special Preventive Group, however, is according to certain specified criteria: 
“appropriate education, professional experience and has professional and moral qualities 
to carry out the functions of the National Preventive Mechanism” (Article 19). Score 1/2.
Term of office
The term of office for the Public Defender is a non-renewable six years. This is a reason-
able term of office that allows the incumbent to independently pursue human rights mat-
ters of concern. There are strong arguments that not offering the option of renewing the 
term of office encourages the incumbent’s independence. The head and staff members 
of the NPM department have guarantees in the general terms and rights that they enjoy 
under the law on public service, but as employees rather than office-holders they are 
appointed for an indefinite period. Score 2/2.
Avoidance of conflict of interest
The Organic Law on the Public Defender (Article 8) sets out a number of clear potential 
conflicts of interest from which a Public Defender would have to divest herself, including 
membership of a political party or employment in the public service. 
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Members of the Special Preventive Group – those people who actually conduct the NPM 
monitoring – are also required not to be members of a political party (Article 19). Score 
2/2.
Adequate remuneration
The salary of the Public Defender is equivalent to that of the chairperson of the Constitu-
tional Court (Article 25(4)), which is a more than adequate guarantee of independence. 
Staff of the NPM are remunerated on the relevant public service salary scale. Score 2/2.
Immunities
The Georgian Public Defender has unusually extensive immunities in order to guarantee 
the independence of her work (Article 5). She enjoys personal immunity from prosecu-
tion, arrest or detention and from search of home, car or office without the approval of 
Parliament, except in the event that she is apprehended in committing a crime. State bod-
ies must guarantee the security of the Public Defender and family. The Public Defender 
has the right not to testify on information gathered in the course of her official functions, 
a right that continues after leaving office. The Public Defender may not be prosecuted for 
opinions or views expressed in the course of her duties.
The law does also spell out certain immunities enjoyed by members of the Special Preven-
tive Group, which for these purposes also includes staff members of the NPM (Article 191). 
It is specified that SPG members act under special authority from the Public Defender and 
are answerable only to her. They are entitled not to give evidence about matters gath-
ered in their monitoring function, an immunity that continues after they are no longer 
SPG members. Mail and correspondence may not be subject to seizure or surveillance. 
Although these are not strictly immunities, the Organic Law also (Article 19) guarantees 
the privacy and confidentiality of interviews with inmates during monitoring visits and 
specifies that these meetings may not be subject to surveillance. Score 2/2.
No instruction from government
The Public Defender “shall act independently” and operate according to the constitution, 
international legal obligations and domestic law. “Any influence on or interference in the 
activity of the Public Defender of Georgia shall be prohibited and shall be punishable by 
law” (Article 4). Score 2/2.
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Removal
Article 10 of the Organic Law sets out seven circumstances in which the tenure of the 
Public Defender may be terminated (one of them being that he or she is dead). This also 
includes resignation or engaging in activities that would have rendered the person ineli-
gible to be Public Defender. It includes being found guilty of a crime – but the immunities 
clauses limit the circumstances in which that may occur. 
The same protection does not obtain for the head of the NPM department or any other 
employee, who may be removed from office in accordance with the law on the public 
service, following a designated procedure set out by law. Score 2/2.
The overall score for the independence criteria is 17/18 or 94.4%.
The next group of questions relates to the resources available to the NPM.
Does it have adequate staff?
Since there is no objective way of measuring how many staff are required for an NPM – of 
course more would always seem desirable – we looked at whether posts were filled, and 
if those who filled them were adequately trained and qualified. The answer to both these 
questions is yes, with the permanent staff supplemented by the numbers and skills of the 
SPG. Score 2/2.
Can it appoint its own staff?
Staff are appointed according the normal recruitment procedures of the PDO, which are 
independent of either the executive or legislature. Score 2/2.
Is there adequate training of existing staff?
There has been consistent training dating back from the formation of the NPM in 2009, 
which is constantly updated. One of the strengths of the NPM has been an unusually high 
level of staff retention, which means that training is not “wasted” but feeds into future 
practice. Training is also provided for non-staff SPG experts. The NPM only scores less than 
the full amount because the requirement for that is personalized training plans, although 
a procedure is in place to implement such a system from January 2020. Score 1/2.
Does the NPM have control over its own budget?
The PDO sets its own budget, which is then subject to vote of Parliament. The budget for 
the NPM is not guaranteed by law and is not regarded as being in any way separate from 
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that of the PDO. In practice, the state budget funds the employment costs and basic infra-
structure for most, but not all, NPM staff, while operations are largely funded by external 
donors. Score 1/2.
Is the NPM adequately funded?
As with levels of staffing, the answer to this will always be that the NPM would benefit 
from more funding. In this instance, however, there is a serious shortfall in operational 
funding from the state budget, even though the NPM does in practice have the necessary 
funds from other sources to carry out its mandate. Score 1/2.
Is the NPM free to raise funds from other sources?
Yes, and there is no corresponding reduction in funds from the state. Score 2/2.
The total score the resources criteria is 9/12 (75%).
The final section of RIPE addresses accessibility and partnerships with civil society.
Is there formal consultation with civil society?
The Special Preventive Group is established by law, which guarantees collaboration be-
tween the NPM and experts within academia, the medical profession, non-governmental 
organizations and other sections of civil society. An advisory group of civil society meets 
regularly to give the NPM guidance on strategic objectives. Score 2/2.
Is there partnership with civil society organizations in activities?
Yes, there are joint projects with NGOs, usually involving joint monitoring, but also train-
ing. Score 2/2.
Does the NPM have local offices?
The PDO has a number of regional offices. While the staff in these offices are not formally 
part of the NPM, we observed that they did carry out some NPM functions and collabo-
rated closely with national mechanism. Score 2/2.
The total score for pluralism, partnerships and accessibility is 6/6 (100%).
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The overall RIPE score is 32/36 or 88.9% with a perfect score for civil society relations 
and the weakest score (75%) for resources.  A comparison of the scores for the individual 
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6. OUTPUTS OF THE NPM: MONITORING AND 
REPORTING
6.1.	 Monitoring			
As noted above, when the NPM was formed in 2009, this new mandate was assigned to 
the department of the PDO that already had responsibility for monitoring closed institu-
tions. However, they used training to increase the capacity of the department, drawing 
first on the CPT and later on training by Arman Danielyan, then a member of the UN Sub-
committee on Prevention of Torture, as well as by the Association for the Prevention of 
Torture (APT) and others. 
The recruitment of the Special Preventive Group, one of the new dimensions introduced 
by the legal amendments that established the NPM, drew in a variety of different areas of 
expertise, particularly in the sphere of health and medicine as well as disciplines such as 
social work. From the outset, SPG experts were paired with NPM staff members, a prac-
tice that continues and ensures a combination of professional expertise and familiarity 
with monitoring procedure. Although a monitoring visit was always preceded by a review 
of reports of previous visits and a study of previous recommendations, in recent years 
the pre-visit procedure has been systematized, with a day’s formal briefing in advance of 
the visit. As well as alerting the visiting team to likely issues, this also involves the devel-
opment of the monitoring instruments – the questionnaires and checklists to be used in 
this institution. At the end of the visit, there is a lengthy debriefing, often lasting a couple 
of days, in which observations are pooled in order to develop a draft of the report and 
identify recommendations. Also, daily debriefings have been introduced in the evenings 
of the visit. While these are not universally popular among tired monitors, it is recognized 
that this has been a very effective way of identifying issues in the course of a monitoring 
visit to ensure that they can be followed up during the visit. 
Visits are planned to target particular issues, such as prison healthcare, with a list of ques-
tions addressing them prepared in advance. We were told that some care is taken to en-
sure that staff of the institution being visited are given a full opportunity to express their 
concerns. As will be discussed below, the NPM has generated a number of recommen-
dations related to the interests and working conditions of police and prison employees. 
Interviews are conducted on both an individual and group basis, and which format is used 
depends on the topics being covered. Individual interviews are conducted out of the sight 
and hearing of prison staff. Where particularly sensitive information is uncovered in the 
course of a private individual interview, further interviews will be conducted with a num-
ber of inmates in order to conceal the source of the information.
Coverage of the various closed institutions is good. Georgia is not a large country, with 
15 prisons and 29 temporary detention isolators. The cycle of visits is non-stop and each 
institution is likely to receive a couple of visits a year. (The exception would be police sta-
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tions, of which there are many more and where visits are more random and irregular.) Vis-
its are unannounced, and even when the NPM was new this did not pose problems as the 
PDO was already a familiar visitor with powers to enter closed institutions unannounced. 
6.2.	 Reporting  
Publication of findings is clearly an indispensable part of the process of monitoring by 
a national preventive mechanism. It is only by documenting findings and enumerating 
recommendations that change can come about. The Georgian NPM produces essentially 
three types of reports.
First, visit reports are drafted immediately after each monitoring visit to a closed institu-
tion. In our research we were necessarily limited to reviewing those reports available in 
English, which is a very small proportion of visit reports. However, based on what we have 
seen, these reports are detailed, precise and professional. They set out clearly the obser-
vations that the monitoring team made and sets these against the appropriate standards 
in national, European and international law. Specific recommendations are attached to 
each set of observations or each issue being reported upon. Recommendations are dis-
cussed in greater detail below, but the ones that we studied in visit reports, while not 
recent, could sometimes have benefited from greater precision. The impact of recom-
mendations will be considered below.
The second type of report is described as “special reports,” which are essentially is-
sue-based, addressing topics such as healthcare in the penitentiary system or the rights 
of persons with disabilities in prisons. Alternatively, they may be general sectoral reports, 
covering psychiatric hospitals or temporary detention isolators. In this instance we were 
able to study a larger sample of reports produced, since most if not all are available in 
English. The quality of these reports, particularly the more recent ones, is high. For exam-
ple, the 2018 report on the health of prisoners in the penitentiary system is a high-quality 
piece of research that combines the findings from the NPM’s experience in monitoring 
prisons with a survey of prison inmates. The report focuses on the healthcare system in 
prisons – a subject of recommendations for many years – as well as other factors that 
have an impact on the health of inmates. These range from food and nutrition, to infes-
tation with pests, to violence by prisoners on each other. The only real weakness of the 
reports is that recommendations, of which there are many, have tended to be buried in 
the text and not sufficiently highlighted. Practice in this regard has improved greatly
The third type of report is the annual reports of the NPM. Periodic reporting to the legis-
lature is a proper function of any ombudsman institution. However, in its earlier years, the 
PDO laboured under a particular burden of being required to report six-monthly to Parlia-
ment. The common complaint at the time was that PDO staff had no time to do anything 
because they were constantly engaged in reporting. The requirement has been reduced 
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to the more reasonable (and common) annual report. Perhaps under the influence of 
the earlier, extremely voluminous six-monthly reports, earlier NPM annual reports are 
extremely lengthy and comprehensive. While these are useful as a complete record of the 
activities and focus of the NPM (and hence an important source for us), this may not have 
been the most effective approach in terms of impact. In recent years, annual reports have 
become shorter and more focused, with recommendations more clearly highlighted. We 
heard comments in interviews to the effect that the more recent reports were preferable.
6.3.	 Using	ATEMPT	to	assess	NPM	monitoring	practices
As part of the process of assessing the overall state of a country’s torture prevention sys-
tem using ATEMPT, we assign scores to the mechanism(s) designated to monitor closed 
institutions. In this section, we discuss the ATEMT scores for the NPM’s monitoring prac-
tices in 2018.
Does domestic monitoring mechanism conduct regular and frequent visits?
Considering the three types of institution that were our focus – prisons, closed psychiatric 
hospitals, and police stations/isolators, the Georgian NPM conducts visits at the rate of 
approximately two a year. (For police stations, the frequency is lower because their num-
ber is much higher, but in principle no one is supposed to be detained there.) Internation-
al comparison suggests that this is both frequent and regular. Score 2/2.
Does domestic monitoring mechanism conduct unannounced visits?
The PDO has the clear legal power to conduct unannounced visits, with closed institutions 
obliged to comply. All visits are unannounced. Score 2/2.
Does the monitoring mechanism conduct interviews with detainees?
NPM visits invariably entail interviews with inmates of the institutions, whether individ-
ual or group. The law provides the conditions for private interviews and prohibits sur-
veillance or interference with privacy. Individual interviews are always conducted under 
these conditions. Group interviews are assumed to be less confidential because of the 
likely presence of informers among the group, which naturally determines which topics 
are discussed in which type of interview. Score 2/2.
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Does the domestic monitoring mechanism publish its findings?
The NPM produces three types of reports: visit reports, special reports, and annual re-
ports. While special reports are necessarily occasional and to date the product of distinct 
funded projects, annual and visit reports are produced routinely and contain detailed 
recommendations. Score 2/2.
Have domestic monitors been sanctioned for their monitoring-related activities?
In the period prior to the creation of the NPM, there were serious threats of reprisal 
against some PDO employees as a consequence of their monitoring work. This has not 
happened in the past 10 years and NPM staff and SPG members have been able to work 
unimpeded. Score 2/2.
Is there torture prevention training of domestic monitoring personnel?
All monitors and SPG members (as well as NGO personnel who participate in joint projects 
with the NPM) have received regular and repeated training in monitoring practice and 
issues related to the prevention of torture since the formation of the NPM. Score 2/2.
The NPM scores a perfect 100% on monitoring practice.12
12 The reason the overall ATEMPT monitoring score discussed in the final section of the report is not 100 per 
cent is that Georgia scores a slightly less than perfect score on monitoring law.  This is because the law does 
not include immunity from sanction for those who communicate with the mechanism.
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7. SHORT-TERM OUTCOMES: THE IMPACT OF NPM 
RECOMMENDATIONS
To determine the impact of the Georgian NPM on reducing torture and ill-treatment – the 
right-hand side of our conceptual model – we consider both short-term outcomes and 
the long-term impact.  The impact of the NPM in the short-term is best gauged by looking 
at what NPM recommendations have been adopted.  As a consequence, we discuss the 
recommendations issued by the NPM.  We are particularly interested in whether they 
are actually implemented, but we also examine the process by which recommendations 
are formulated, how they are communicated to the relevant authorities, what dialogue 
ensues, if any, the role of Parliament in monitoring and implementing recommendations, 
and the NPM’s own system for follow-up. 
Improvements in the treatment and conditions of persons in closed institutions is always 
going to be determined by a variety of factors. Nevertheless, in order to determine what 
specific part a monitoring mechanism has played in securing change, it is useful to identify 
the recommendations made and to determine how far these have been implemented. Of 
course, the mere fact that a change was previously included in a list of NPM recommenda-
tions is not itself proof that it was the NPM’s advocacy that secured the change. Neverthe-
less, it is undeniable that the NPM is engaged in a process of formulating policy proposals 
for prisons, police custody, temporary detention isolators, and psychiatric hospitals that 
goes far beyond what is offered by any other non-executive agency. One of the changes 
that was identified in our research was an increasingly close engagement and dialogue 
with the governmental authorities responsible for the safety of persons in closed institu-
tions. This day-to-day engagement was not there at the outset in 2009 and has evolved 
over the years. On the NPM side it is a conscious strategy to discuss recommendations 
and attempt to bring officials on board, as compared with the earlier process which only 
entailed submitting written recommendations. Based on our interviews, it seems that this 
process is most developed in relation to the department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
responsible for temporary detention isolators, although it was apparent that the same 
strategy is in place, and with some effect, in relation to penitentiaries and psychiatric 
hospitals.
The recommendations issued by the Public Defender as national preventive mechanism, 
like all other recommendations of the PDO, are included in the annual report to Parliament 
and considered there by the Committee on Human Rights. In recent years, the Commit-
tee has started the practice of endorsing many of these recommendations, a procedure 
welcomed (cautiously) by the NPM. The Parliament of Georgia has recently published a 
resolution endorsing the Public Defender’s 2018 Parliamentary Recommendations. In this 
resolution, 259 (72.9 per cent) of recommendations out of 355 were reflected. This is the 
highest number of Public Defender’s recommendations that have been endorsed.  How-
ever, these did not include those recommendations issued to the parliament itself. The 
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resolution established a working group to consider the recommendations addressed to 
Parliament. When these are taken into account, the number of endorsed recommenda-
tions rises to 308 or 84.1 per cent. 
The advantage, clearly, is that a parliamentary motion adds extra pressure on the relevant 
government body to implement the recommendations. It is for this reason that the NPM 
has welcomed this approach. The downside, however, which leads us to be sceptical of its 
value, is that those recommendations of the Public Defender not endorsed by Parliament 
will be less likely to be implemented. They will be seen as second-class recommendations 
carrying less weight than those with parliamentary endorsement. The clear understand-
ing should be that there is a legal requirement on government authorities to respond to 
all recommendations from the Public Defender.
At an operational level, the NPM takes into account prior recommendations. Hence, for 
example, in the briefing sessions in advance of visits, relevant recommendations will be 
considered because they will be one of the things under observation during the moni-
toring process. In that sense, there is some monitoring of compliance. However, it is only 
more recently that a tracking mechanism has been put in place that attempts a systematic 
evaluation of compliance, or non-compliance, with all prior recommendations. This is an 
extremely important means of enhancing the efficacy of recommendations, which should 
be further developed and maintained.
Non-compliance with recommendations does not, of course, necessarily mean rejection. 
Many of the NPM’s recommendations have entailed very substantial spending on the 
government’s part, which often means that prompt implementation is unlikely. Howev-
er, such recommendations – for example, including the closure of penitentiaries and the 
building of others – have in some instances been implemented in the long run. As will be 
seen from the discussion below, this has been more often the case in relation to prisons, 
which have been a government priority in recent years, rather than mental health care, 
which has not. 
7.1.	 Penitentiaries
When the NPM was established in 2009, some of the worst aspects of torture and 
ill-treatment in police custody had been addressed, but problems in the penitentiary sys-
tem were extremely serious and attracting little attention. As is well known, this changed 
dramatically in 2012 with the release of video evidence of torture of inmates in Georgia’s 
prisons, raising this high on the political agenda, arguably contributing to the downfall of 
the United National Movement government in general elections, and ensuring that prison 
reform was top of the agenda for the newly elected Georgian Dream government. It was 
this accidental combination of political events that created the context in which problems 
of ill-treatment could be seriously addressed, but it would be incorrect to assume that 
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no one was aware of these problems earlier. From its first annual report in 2010, the 
NPM was drawing attention to “physical assault,” as well as “degrading and humiliating 
treatment by the officials of penitentiary establishments.”13 Even at this early date, the 
NPM identified the obstacles to full investigation of alleged torture and ill-treatment, with 
inmates being reluctant to complain against officials who still exercise power over them. 
Complaints were often withdrawn and injuries were explained as being self-inflicted or 
the result of accidents. As the NPM put it, 
the syndrome of fear has emerged within inmates that certainly, considerably hinder 
identification of facts of ill-treatment and punishment of offenders.14
The political context within which the issue of prison torture was addressed meant that, 
more or less for the first time, there were thorough investigations of perpetrators whose 
acts predated the new government and a number of officials were brought to justice. 
This can be counted as a successful outcome, triggered in part by the attention that the 
NPM paid to the issue. Unfortunately, the systemic lack of effective investigation, which 
continued after 2012, is evidence that the NPM has not succeeded in ending impunity. 
Almost all prosecutions of officials for ill-treatment of persons in their custody have re-
lated to events that took place up through 2012. Charges that are brought tend to be for 
lesser offences. For example, in 2018 there were 18 prosecutions. Of these, three were 
prison officials charged with inhuman or degrading treatment and 15 were police officers 
charged with excessive use of force. This ratio of prisons to police roughly reflected the 
overall number of investigations last year: 395 of which 367 were police and the remain-
ing 28 prisons. The PDO referred 221 cases to the prosecutor’s office, but investigations 
were opened on only 29 of these cases.15
The PDO/NPM has been particularly vocal on the issue of impunity over the years, to 
the extent of taking its campaign outside national borders to gatherings in Strasbourg 
and Geneva. Recommendations over the years have set out the case for establishing an 
independent mechanism for the investigation and prosecution of crimes against inmates 
by state officials.
A major step forward has been the passing of a law providing for a State Inspectorate 
with powers to act as a special investigation body looking at allegations of torture and 
ill-treatment against officials. At the time of writing, this body is not actually operational 
in its investigative function. And questions remain as to how effective it will be. It appears 
that it will have limited human and material resources. Decisions on whether to prosecute 
will continue to rest with the prosecutor’s office, not with the new body. But there may be 
reason for cautious optimism.  
More broadly, there have been substantial and visible improvements in the treatment 
of inmates in the penitentiary system between 2009 and 2019, both in living conditions 
and in the eradication of the previously widespread practice of collective and informal 
13 Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 2010, p. 7.
14 Ibid.
15 Information provided by Prosecutor’s Office, department of human rights protection, 14 August 2019.
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punishments. Many of these improvements can be traced to NPM recommendations, as 
we discuss below.
One important step has been the introduction of new procedures and templates based 
upon the Istanbul Protocol to document cases of torture and ill-treatment, with medical 
doctors trained in its use. 16 This will have to be evaluated in light of the broader assess-
ment of the healthcare regime in prisons (see below), but it undoubtedly represents a 
significant step forward.
The NPM also finally emerged victorious in a long battle over whether its monitors were 
permitted to take photographs to document injuries or poor conditions in prisons.17 They 
have succeeded in securing this power, although photographs may only be used to doc-
ument ill-treatment for the purposes of investigation, and are not to be published in re-
ports.
Another important victory has been to require prisons to retain footage from closed cir-
cuit television cameras for at least one month (or longer if it is required as evidence). 
When the NPM was established in 2009, CCTV evidence would almost invariably be 
wiped, ostensibly by a system with insufficient capacity, meaning that recordings were 
never available to substantiate claims of ill-treatment. The PDO was in communication 
with the Council of Ministers of the Council of Europe over the execution of the judgment 
in the Strasbourg case of Merabishvili v Georgia, in which one issue revolved around the 
erasing of CCTV footage of the applicant in custody. The PDO succeeded incrementally 
in extending the storage period from the initial 24 hours, to five days, and then up to a 
month, at least in those prisons with audiovisual systems with sufficient capacity.18
Security and discipline  
The NPM has had to address the problem of security and disciplinary measures that have 
constituted ill-treatment. Conflict in prisons is dealt with by confining prisoners to “de-es-
calation rooms.” It used to be that no time limit was set on this, amounting to indefi-
nite solitary confinement, defined by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment as torture.19 The NPM 
pressed for confinement in de-escalation rooms to be limited to 24 hours.20 Ultimately a 
16 See National Preventive Mechanism, 2015, p. 29.
17 See Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 2013, p. 11.
18  For example, The Report of the National Preventive Mechanism, 2014, p. 33; National Preventive Mecha-
nism, 2015, p. 41; Human Rights Situation in Closed Institutions: National Preventive Mechanism, 2016, p. 
44.
19 Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment A/66/268, 5 August 2011.
20 For example, Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 
2010, pp. 16-17; Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 
2012; Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 2013, p. 
12; National Preventive Mechanism, 2015, p. 41; Human Rights Situation in Closed Institutions: National 
Preventive Mechanism, 2016, p. 44.
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72-hour limit has been set, which at least represents a significant improvement on the 
previous situation.
Another security issue that posed a persistent problem was strip-searching of women 
prisoners. This procedure has now been brought in line with international standards, af-
ter strong pressure and recommendations from the NPM,21 and scanners have also been 
installed for searches in the country’s one women’s prison. However, the NPM continues 
to receive some allegations of abusive strip searches.
The prison regime remains extremely strict, with a relatively weak emphasis on rehabilita-
tion (see below). This is especially the case in closed and high security prisons. However, it 
is no longer a lawless environment. The previous practice of imposing restrictions without 
any legal basis has been largely eliminated. One unintended consequence of the liberal-
ization of the penitentiary regime has been the re-emergence of criminal subcultures and 
the role of gangs or criminal organizations in imposing their own discipline, an issue to 
which the NPM has drawn attention.22
Conditions of detention 
From the outset, the NPM has brought the poor material conditions in prisons to the 
attention of the authorities.23 Responsibility for the prisons has shifted over the life of 
the NPM. In 2009, it was removed from the Ministry of Justice into a new Ministry of 
Corrections and Legal Assistance (later the Ministry of Corrections). The Penitentiary De-
partment operated autonomously under the nominal authority of the Ministry – with a 
separate office and budget – and the problem of torture and poor conditions was not 
addressed. After the change of government, in 2015 the Penitentiary Department was 
fully integrated into the Ministry of Corrections. In 2018, however, responsibility for the 
penitentiaries was shifted back to its original home, the Ministry of Justice, in the form of 
the Special Penitentiary Service.
There has been a substantial investment in the penitentiary estate. The NPM has recom-
mended the closure of several prisons, which have indeed been replaced with modern 
buildings or thoroughly renovated.24 
Just as importantly, there has been a massive decrease in the prison population. By 2010, 
Georgia had the highest per capita prison population in the world – 530 prisoners per 
100,000 citizens, amounting to 23,684 in total. This represented a massive increase from 
just 152 per 100,000 in 1994, 7,376 in total.25 A combination of amnesties, rehabilitation 
21 For example, Human Rights Situation in Closed Institutions: National Preventive Mechanism, 2016, p. 168.
22 Human Rights Situation in Closed Institutions: National Preventive Mechanism, 2016, p. 38.
23 For example, Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 
2012, p. 40.
24 For example, Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 
2010, p. 16; Human Rights Situation in Closed Institutions: National Preventive Mechanism, 2016, p. 77.
25 Does Torture Prevention Work? p. 401.
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and a radical change in sentencing policy more than halved that total after 2012, with the 
prison population now in the range of 9-11,000 persons. Such changes have been advo-
cated in NPM recommendations.26 The Constitutional Court has also issued judgments 
that preclude imprisonment for minor drug offences.
One area that has improved as a result of NPM recommendations has been the trans-
port of prisoners outside the penitentiaries. Vehicles used to be old and in poor condi-
tion. NPM inspection visits identified boxes inside the vehicles that, on questioning, were 
revealed be used to transport women and LGBT prisoners. This practice has now been 
stopped and the vehicles replaced.
The lack of rehabilitative activities has been identified as a major problem,27 combined 
with a lack of social workers employed in the prisons. Recently the Ministry of Justice has 
begun to hire them in response to an NPM recommendation.
Health care  
One of the biggest issues within the penitentiary system, which the NPM has repeated-
ly addressed, is healthcare. From 2010 the NPM recommended major structural chang-
es to the prison health care system. Its ultimate aim, still not achieved, is that prison 
healthcare be independently run under the national healthcare system.28 Aside from the 
overall improvements in quality that would result from this, it would establish a level of 
independence that would assure greater confidence in examination of alleged victims of 
ill-treatment. While this ultimate step has not been achieved, there have been significant 
improvements in the quality of care over the past decade, with NPM recommendations 
forming a template for these reforms.29
After 2012 the number of doctors in prisons was increased, with the result that access 
to medical care became much easier. Treatment became more accessible, with medica-
tion more readily available. Measures for stricter quality control were introduced and 
record-keeping improved. Regulations to ensure medical confidentiality were introduced 
and rooms provided for confidential meetings with doctors. 
The penitentiary system has made serious efforts to tackle drug abuse in prisons, with 
detoxification and methadone programmes and a psychosocial rehabilitation programme 
26 For example, Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 
2010, p. 22; Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 2012, 
p. 47.
27 See Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 2010, p. 26; 
Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 2012, p. 45; Hu-
man Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 2013, p. 25; Human 
Rights Situation in Closed Institutions: National Preventive Mechanism, 2016, p. 94.
28 See Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 2010, p. 47; 
Human Rights Situation in Closed Institutions: National Preventive Mechanism, 2016, p. 43.
29 For example, Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 
2010, p. 46.
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for drug users. There have been preventive screening programmes for tuberculosis, hep-
atitis C and HIV, as well as screening for various non-communicable diseases. Suicide pre-
vention programmes have been introduced in all prisons.30 The NPM has been consis-
tently critical of the more curative and reactive approach that has been typical of prison 
healthcare, and these preventive programmes have been, at least in part, a product of the 
more proactive approach advocated.31 This has yielded benefits. Mortality rates within 
the penitentiary system dropped dramatically. There were 142 deaths in prison in 2010, 
compared to 21 in 2018. Even allowing for the dramatic decrease in the prison population 
over the same period, the mortality rate has more than halved.
Another area of significant improvement has been food, where meals are now planned 
based upon their nutritional value and special dietary needs are accommodated.32 
Complaints and inspection  
Prior to 2012, prison administrations would systematically block inmates from sending 
complaints out of the prison (for example to the Public Defender). The situation improved 
after 2012, with a recognition that prisoners needed some legitimate outlet for grievanc-
es, but in recent years they have become more reluctant to utilize complaints channels 
because of threats from criminal organizations within the prisons.
The process of internal inspection by the penitentiary authorities has improved over the 
past decade, with inspection being more regular and proactive. In addition, far more ef-
fort is made to inform prisoners of their rights, with booklets and brochures widely avail-
able, including in other languages for prisoners who do not understand Georgian.33 
Contact with outside world  
A continuing issue has been the obstacles that the penitentiary system places in the way 
of prisoners’ contact with the outside world. There have been improvements in recent 
years, in response to NPM recommendations.34 No prior consent is required for remand 
prisoners to make phone calls, send letters and receive visits. These rights can now only 
be restricted on the basis of a reasoned decision of an investigator or prosecutor.
For convicted prisoners it is no longer possible to impose a complete ban on contact with 
the outside world. Previously, prisoners placed in a disciplinary punishment cell could be 
30 See Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 2010, p. 62; 
Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 2013, p. 41-44; 
The Report of the National Preventive Mechanism, 2014, p. 120. Human Rights Situation in Closed Institu-
tions: National Preventive Mechanism, 2016, p. 155.
31 The Report of the National Preventive Mechanism, 2014, p.118.
32 See, Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 2010, p. 58; 
Human Rights Situation in Closed Institutions: National Preventive Mechanism, 2016, p. 157.
33 Human Rights Situation in Closed Institutions: National Preventive Mechanism, 2016, pp. 124-5.
34 For example, Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 
2010, p. 24.
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deprived of family visits for a year; the law has now been amended to remove this pun-
ishment. 
Visiting rights have been expanded, with long-term family visits available once a year in 
all prisons and video visits introduced.35 Prisons have started to remove glass partition 
screens in visiting rooms after many years of NPM recommendations.36 
Vulnerable groups  
Protections for vulnerable groups in prison have improved. A special women’s prison has 
been built and conditions of imprisonment for women, including mothers and babies, 
have improved. Family visits are allowed and mothers are permitted to leave the peniten-
tiary on weekends once a child reaches the age of three and can no longer be held with 
the mother in prison. More rehabilitation programmes and gender-specific health care 
has been introduced. As noted above, search procedures for women prisoners have been 
brought in line with international standards. 
For children in conflict with the law, the most important change has been the increased 
use of alternatives to prison resulting in many fewer juvenile prisoners. For those who are 
imprisoned, material conditions have improved, with a broader range of activities.
Fewer people with disabilities are now imprisoned and for those who are within the pen-
itentiary system, prisons have adapted cells for people with physical disabilities and staff 
have been trained on their specific needs.37
Staff  
It was suggested to us by a senior official at the Ministry of Justice that penitentiary staff 
resented the constant negative criticism emanating from the NPM (a view not echoed by 
the head of the Special Penitentiary Service). However, one of the striking aspects of the 
NPM’s recommendations has been their emphasis on looking after the interests of prison 
employees. (It was also described to us by several different interviewees how NPM visits 
made a point of listening to staff grievances.) For example, staff did not receive health 
insurance as a service benefit until it was introduced as a consequence of an NPM rec-
ommendation. Salaries have increased and food has been provided, in accordance with 
an NPM recommendation, for those who are working a 24-hour shift. In some instances, 
transport to and from work is now provided, since institutions are sometimes remote.
35 Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 2013, p. 21; Hu-
man Rights Situation in Closed Institutions: National Preventive Mechanism, 2016, pp. 117-18.
36 For example, Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 
2012, p. 43; Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 2013, 
p. 19; The Report of the National Preventive Mechanism, 2014, p. 153.
37 See, Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 2012, p. 118; 
Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 2013, p. 59.
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Training has led to increased competence and clearer job descriptions are available.38 The 
main outstanding problem is that numbers of staff are still insufficient (which is the ex-
planation, at least in part, for the increased dominance of criminal subcultures in the 
prisons). Medical staff has increased in number, which has contributed to the positive 
outcomes noted above, but numbers are still insufficient in some prisons.  
7.2.	 Police	and	temporary	detention	isolators
Many of the decisive improvements in treatment of persons arrested and pre-trial de-
tainees predated the creation of the NPM, although the PDO was an important actor in 
initiating a systematic and thorough reform of the police and the creation of temporary 
detention isolators to replace police custody for those arrested before their presentation 
in court. However, neither police stations nor isolators are free of problems and the NPM 
has made extensive recommendations for their improvement. These have not always 
been successful. Isolators are, in general, fit for criminal suspects who are held there for 
no longer than 72 hours, but those detained on administrative matters can be held for up 
to 15 days, for which the isolators are unfit.39
Nevertheless, the temporary detention isolators are becoming safer places. A complaints 
procedure is now available, as a result of an NPM recommendation. Medical care in the 
isolators has been improved, with doctors employed in most.40 Where doctors are not 
present, sick detainees are promptly transferred to hospital by ambulance. Detainees re-
ceive an automatic medical examination when they are transferred to the isolator. There 
is a new form for the documentation of bodily injuries, based on the Istanbul Protocol. 
The medical doctor is required to notify any cases of torture or other ill-treatment to the 
prosecutor’s office.
The use of CCTV cameras in police stations has been expanded, but the period for storage 
of recordings is still insufficient.41 Police on patrol are required to wear body cameras, but 
there is no obligation for them to make recordings of their interactions with the public yet.
Record-keeping in police stations is now more rigorous, with a proper detention log.42 
Guidelines have been developed for interviewing persons with psychosocial and intellec-
tual disabilities, again on the recommendation of the NPM, but these have not been fully 
implemented.
38 See Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 2010, p. 27; 
The Report of the National Preventive Mechanism, 2014, pp. 52-3; National Preventive Mechanism, 2015, p. 
35.
39 See Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 2012, p. 79; 
Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 2013, p. 54.
40 For example, Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 
2010, p. 37.
41 Human Rights Situation in Closed Institutions: National Preventive Mechanism, 2017, pp. 29-30.
42 Human Rights Situation in Closed Institutions: National Preventive Mechanism, 2016, pp. 218-19; Human 
Rights Situation in Closed Institutions: National Preventive Mechanism, 2017, pp 29-30.
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While the worst period of police torture is now in the past, we heard repeated allegations 
of excessive use of force by the police. The NPM echoes this with reports of cases of suspi-
cious injuries incurred in police custody, as well as identifying instances where detention 
safeguards were violated and making appropriate recommendations for compliance.43 
This differs from the more sanguine assessment offered by the CPT on its recent visits.
As with prison staff, the NPM has also advocated on behalf of improved conditions of 
service for police officers, including salary increases.44
7.3.	 Psychiatric	institutions	
The NPM has probably been least successful in improving conditions in psychiatric hos-
pitals. This is due in part to the low priority given to this issue by the state. The mental 
health system has been consistently underfunded. The NPM has recommended increases, 
which have occurred but not to the necessary levels. In 2015, the NP reported that the 
budget allocation for psychiatric healthcare had doubled since 2014, but also noted that 
funding continued to be inadequate, with not enough beds for long-term patients and 
lack of community services.45 According to the Public Defender’s 2018 Parliamentary Re-
port, there was an increase in funding of mental health care from 20.5 million lari in 2018 
to 24 million lari in 2019 – a welcome change, although the cost of a bed-day for patients 
remains the same. The NPM has advocated a strategy entailing increased community care 
and smaller institutions.46 
In practice, the system continues to be dominated by large institutions, often with very 
poor conditions.47 The Public Defender herself has drawn attention to very bad conditions 
at psychiatric hospitals in Surami and Bediani. In 2018, at least partly as a response, the 
infrastructure in the Surami Psychiatric Clinic was renovated. Parts of the Academician 
B. Naneishvili National Centre for Mental Health were also renovated in 2018, with the 
construction of a new building. However, most patients still live in the old building, where 
there continue to be problems with food, personal hygiene, clothing and linen.
There has been some effort on the part of the authorities to develop a strategy for im-
proving mental health care provision and to increase the available resources, reflected in 
the improvements mentioned above. The National Concept on Mental Health, adopted 
by Parliament in 2013, advocates deinstitutionalization and explicitly acknowledges the 
findings of the PDO in informing its new approach.48 However, monitoring by the NPM, 
recorded by the Public Defender in her 2018 parliamentary report, has shown that timely 
43 For example, Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 
2012, p. 73.
44 Human Rights Situation in Closed Institutions: National Preventive Mechanism, 2017, p. 30.
45 National Preventive Mechanism: Report on the Monitoring of Mental Health Institutions, 2015, pp. 20-1.
46 Human Rights in Closed Institutions: Report of National Preventive Mechanism of Georgia, 2012, pp. 111-12.
47 Human Rights Situation in Closed Institutions: National Preventive Mechanism, 2017, p. 30.
48 National Preventive Mechanism: Report on the Monitoring of Mental Health Institutions, 2015, p. 22.
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implementation of the strategy has been problematic. The LEPL Agency of State Regula-
tion of Medical Activity has been effective of late in monitoring the compliance of psychi-
atric institutions with their licensing terms – and finding a number of them falling short 
of the requirements. The SPG has argued that examining compliance with licensing terms 
is only one element of monitoring psychiatric facilities. It should be proactively assessed 
how far patients receive case based on the bio-psycho-social model, with due respect for 
patients’ rights. By these criteria, according to the Public Defender’s 2018 parliamentary 
report, the monitoring by the LEPL Agency of State Regulation of Medical Activity has not 
been adequate. Draft amendments have been proposed to the Law on Psychiatric are, 
which the PDO is currently reviewing.
The NPM’s work on the mental health sector is closely coordinated with the unit of the 
PDO monitoring compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Dis-
abilities (CRPD). The NPM has followed the CRPD in advocating the deinstitutionalization 
of mental health care, with no great success so far. This also entails a reduction in the use 
of physical and chemical restraint of psychiatric patients – again an issue where the NPM 
has made little headway, despite recommendations.
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8. LONG-TERM OUTCOME: THE ROLE OF THE NPM IN 
REDUCING TORTURE IN GEORGIA
ATEMPT allows us to compare the strength of the preventive mechanisms in place in Geor-
gia in 2008 (before the establishment of the NPM) and, based upon our new research this 
year, in 2018. In this instance at least, ATEMPT allows us to do something that is always 
a great challenge when it comes to assessing the impact of any particular human rights 
body, such as a national human rights institution. Because the scores in two of the four 
categories (prosecution and complaints) remained constant over the ten-year period, any 
reduction in the incidence of torture is most likely to be a consequence of improvements 
in detention and/or monitoring as opposed to prosecution or complaints.  
Figure 3 reports the detention, prosecution, complaints, and monitoring scores for Geor-
gia in 2008 and 2018.  The higher the score, the more preventive mechanisms in that 
category in place, and the more effective those mechanisms are for reducing torture.  The 
highest score possible is 100% – meaning that all of the preventive mechanisms identified 
by ATEMPT are in place.  Lower scores mean that there are fewer mechanisms in place 
and/or the mechanisms that are in place have been found to be less effective in reducing 
torture than the ones that have not been put in place.  The scores for each individual 
ATEMPT question, and the weighting factors assigned, for both 2008 and 2018 are includ-
ed as Appendix B. 
What is clear from comparing the scores in Figure 3 is that (1) the monitoring and com-
plaints scores are much higher than the prosecution and detention scores and (2) there 
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As indicated in Figure 3, the scores for monitoring and complaints in 2008 were both 
high (82.74% and 82.14% respectively), reflecting both the strong legal basis of the PDO 
and its good practice in both its complaints and monitoring functions. However, as noted 
above, the complaints function is found overall to be of relatively little significance as a 
measure to prevent torture and ill-treatment. The scores for detention and prosecution, 
both of which are more important for prevention, were lower than the monitoring and 
complaints scores in 2008 (55.13% and 55.36%). 
The detention score reflects the introduction of some strong procedural protections in 
law prior to 2008, but also some continuing gaps, for example in the use of video moni-
toring and electronic recording of police interviews. It also reflects some weaknesses in 
practice: while families are almost always promptly informed of a person’s detention and 
the detainee is brought before a judge within the legal time limit from the formal time 
of detention, there continued to be some use of unofficial detention – for example, in 
manipulating records of the time of arrest – and detainees were not always informed of 
their right to a lawyer.
On prosecution, the score also reflects a gap between law and practice, with torture and 
deliberate ill-treatment criminalized, but seldom properly and effectively investigated or 
prosecuted. Prosecutions of alleged torturers were few, as were conviction rates and offi-
cials convicted of such crimes could expect to face lower penalties than equivalent civilian 
criminals.
Ten years later, the scores for two of the clusters, complaints and prosecution, remain the 
same as they were in 2008.  However, there has been an increase in both the monitoring 
and detention scores.
The maintenance of the high complaints score reflects the fact that in both law and prac-
tice Georgia in 2008 already had a highly developed non-judicial complaints mechanism in 
the PDO. The only weaknesses identified in our scoring related to the legal powers of the 
PDO to compel the production of evidence and witnesses and its powers to recommend 
redress. None of this changed between 2008 and 2018 – the amendments to the Organic 
Law on the Public Defender in 2009 and 2010 did not affect these points.  
The low prosecution score reflects almost entirely the actual practice (as opposed to the 
law), with a general lack of investigations of those alleged to have committed torture or 
ill-treatment.  Even when prosecutions are initiated, the rate of conviction is far below 
that for equivalent crimes committed by ordinary criminals and, even on conviction, sen-
tences are much lower. Despite a number of prosecutions relating to the well-publicized 
acts of torture in prison that were exposed in 2012, the general pattern has not changed 
between 2008 and 2018. This is an issue that has been a constant focus of recommenda-
tions from the PDO, dating from before the formation of the NPM. The creation of a new 
special investigator’s office with a mandate to investigate (but not prosecute) allegations 
of torture and ill-treatment might make a difference in this. This proposal has been ad-
opted by government but, since it has not yet been implemented, we cannot determine 
its effect.
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The detention index, we know from our multi-country study, is the most important in 
terms of impact on the incidence of torture. The improvement from 55.13% in 2008 to 
60.26% in 2018 is attributable to two changes. One is the introduction of mandatory med-
ical examinations for detainees on transfer from police custody to temporary detention 
isolators. The other, which is directly attributable to the recommendations of the NPM, 
is the increased use of closed circuit television to monitor police stations and temporary 
detention, as well as a significant improvement in the retention of recordings (from 24 
hours to approximately one month) and better practice in making the recordings available 
in the event of an investigation.
The monitoring index directly measures the work of the NPM, since the PDO is the official 
monitoring body for both police and temporary detention on the one hand, and peniten-
tiaries on the other. (We measure the two separately because in some countries different 
bodies are assigned to different types of deprivation of liberty.) The monitoring score for 
2018 is nearly perfect (97.44% out of 100%), reflecting both a strong legal framework and 
good practice. From the perspective of our scoring, the legal framework did not change 
between 2008 and 2018, although the 2009 amendments to the Organic Law on the Public 
Defender provided the legal basis for the NPM. That law established the Public Defender 
as a monitoring body appointed by Parliament with strong guarantees of independence, 
both in the appointment process and in the legal protections against interference in its 
work. Although the 2009 amendments specifically designated the PDO as the NPM, there 
were already strong guarantees of independence through the appointment process and 
the prohibitions on interference with the work of the Public Defender, as well as the im-
munities that the office enjoys. In its visiting functions, the PDO had the power to conduct 
unannounced visits to closed institutions, a power that is carried over to the NPM, as well 
as to conduct private interviews with inmates. This confidentiality is explicitly protected 
against interference. The one weakness in the law, which precludes a maximum score on 
ATEMPT, is that the protections and immunities that attach to the Public Defender, and to 
a lesser extent the members of the Special Preventive Group, are not available for those 
whom the PDO/NPM interviews. Article 21 of the OPCAT explicitly requires that “No au-
thority or official shall order, apply, permit or tolerate any sanction against any person” 
who communicates with the NPM, and there are clear prohibitions in the Organic Law on 
the Public Defender (Articles 4 and 5) on interfering or impeding the activities of the Pub-
lic Defender. However, there is no explicit protection against reprisals for those cooperat-
ing with the NPM, in the event either that the clear right of confidentiality is breached or 
that the authorities simply take measures against those that they presume to be sources 
of information. There needs to be a specific criminal offence of reprisal against those de-
prived of liberty, as well as procedures to protect the NPM’s informants. The risk with such 
procedures, clearly, is that they may actually help the authorities to identify informants. 
However, these procedures might include removal of persons to somewhere else within 
the custodial system, as well as maintaining vigilant monitoring of their situation.
The main difference between the monitoring scores over the 10-year period is not the 
legal framework but the fact that threats against the staff of the PDO, which had been a 
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feature in the years prior to the establishment of the NPM, have not been repeated since. 
During that earlier period there were threats against PDO monitors in the Samegrelo re-
gion. In 2006, police threatened to arrest and plant drugs on a staff member of the Zugdidi 
office after he witnessed a detainee being beaten. In 2007, another staff member was 
accused of “provoking a crime” during a monitoring visit.49 There has been no recurrence 
of such threats in recent years.
Overall ATEMPT score  
ATEMPT provides not only four individual cluster scores (detention, prosecution, com-
plaints and monitoring) but an overall score that combines the four categories, weighting 
the more important categories in preventing torture more heavily than the less important 
categories.  A comparison of the overall scores for Georgia in 2008 and 2018 can be found 
in Table 2.  As the scores in this table indicate, Georgia has implemented changes that 
have improved their overall torture prevention scores, from 63.47% to 67.62%, but there 
is much room for improvement.  Detention practices remain a problem, and prosecution 
practices remain a bigger problem since there have been no improvements in the latter 
at all in the past 10 years.
Table	2:	ATEMPT	scores	for	2008	and	2018






detention 55.13% 0.45 0.248077
prosecution 55.36% 0.30 0.166071
complaints 82.14% 0.05 0.041071
monitoring 89.74% 0.20 0.179487
SCORE 0.634707 63.47%
2018
detention 60.26% 0.45 0.271154
prosecution 55.36% 0.30 0.166071
complaints 82.14% 0.05 0.041071
monitoring 97.44% 0.20 0.194872
SCORE 0.673168 67.32%
49  Does Torture Prevention Work? p 416.
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9. CONCLUSION
When we were commissioned to conduct this study, the working title was described as 
“Does the Georgian NPM Work?” echoing the title of our early study. It is clear from what 
we found that the answer to that question is “yes.”
The ultimate measure of an NPM’s effectiveness might appear to be whether the inci-
dence of torture and ill-treatment has reduced. Based on our interviews, the consensus 
seems to be that it has. Big steps had been made to reduce torture in police and pre-trial 
custody before the creation of the NPM, but in the past decade the significant improve-
ments have been made in conditions in penitentiaries. Although the NPM had persistently 
drawn attention to torture and ill-treatment in prisons prior to 2012, it was the emergence 
of torture as a national political issue that created the momentum for change. Broader 
improvements in prison conditions have been consequent upon recommendations of the 
NPM. The move that has had the greatest impact has been the dramatic reduction in the 
prison population, through amnesties and reformed sentencing policies. This in turn has 
allowed other systemic improvements, including closure and refurbishment of prisons. 
The temporary detention isolator system, introduced before the creation of the NPM, re-
mains a highly effective protection in the early days in custody. Although police treatment 
of suspects remains a great improvement on 15 years ago, there have been persistent 
reports of excessive force being used in arrests and outside formal custody. This is an issue 
that the NPM has identified. The situation in psychiatric hospitals is where least progress 
has been seen in the past decade. The NPM recognizes that it should be a priority to de-
velop capacity and understanding of mental health issues (both in specialized institutions 
and in prisons). 
The architecture of protection was largely in place a decade ago, although there have 
been marginal improvements, identified by ATEMPT, in detention and monitoring prac-
tice. Investigation and prosecution of torturers remains a significant weak point – again 
one that has been persistently identified by the NPM. It is to be hoped that the new state 
inspector’s office will begin to address this problem.
The NPM has enjoyed a remarkable stability in its staffing, since a massive turnover in 
2013-14. This means that training has been beneficial for the work of the institution, with 
staff being retained to implement their skills. The Special Preventive Group is an import-
ant resource. It has provided continuity, as well as skills that could not realistically be ex-
pected among the staff. While the Organic Law on the Public Defender does an effective 
job of buttressing the Public Defender qua NPM from external interference, one episode 
in the NPM’s history underlines the danger of differences between a Public Defender and 
the NPM staff. Overall, there is no doubt that the NPM benefits from being located within 
the PDO, since it can draw on expertise from elsewhere within the institution and also 
benefits from the Public Defender’s high public reputation.
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The system of reporting and recommendations has become more streamlined over the 
years – a general improvement – and there have been recent innovations in tracking rec-
ommendations, as well as a more consultative approach in presenting recommendations 
to government. These all seem to have strengthened the NPM’s effectiveness. The prac-
tice adopted by the human rights committee of Parliament in adopting endorsing some 
– but not all – of these recommendations has been cautiously welcomed by the NPM. 
However, this seems to us unwise, since it potentially downgrades some of these recom-
mendations to optional status and allows the Parliament to assess the priority rather than 
the NPM. The law is quite clear on the obligation of governmental authorities to respond 
to recommendations of the Public Defender within a specified time, which should contin-
ue to be insisted upon.
The material resources available to the NPM have been adequate, but the lack of a desig-
nated independent budget seems to us potentially dangerous. While resources have been 
sufficient, there are still risks, with the NPM’s operational budget essentially donated by 
outside funders. This creates a dangerous dependency. To continue to be effective, the 
NPM must continue to monitor and issue recommendations with the same efficiency and 
regularity. If it is unable to do so, the implications for torture prevention in Georgia would 
be serious.        
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Appendix A: ATEMPT Questionnaire
Assessment Tool for Evaluating Mechanisms for Preventing Torture (ATEMPT)
Part I: DETENTION 
Law
Q1.  Has unofficial detention been criminalized?
a. unofficial detention not criminalized
b. unofficial detention criminalized, but with exceptions (e.g., delayed 
registration of detainee not criminalized)
c. all forms of unofficial detention criminalized
Q2.  Is there a requirement that a family member or another person of choice be 
promptly informed (within the same day) of the detainee’s detention?
a. no requirement that family be notified
b. notification required, but with exceptions (e.g., delays possible for detainee 
held under security provisions)
c. no exceptions to requirement that some family member or other person of 
choice be notified promptly
Q3.  Is there a legal provision requiring prompt access (at a minimum, prior to the first 
interrogation) to a lawyer?
a. no requirement of immediate access to lawyer
b. access required, but with exceptions (e.g., delays possible for detainee held 
under security provisions)
c. no exceptions to the requirement of immediate access to lawyer
Q4.  Is there a legal provision requiring prompt presentation (within 48 hours) of the 
detainee before a judge?
a. no requirement for prompt presentation before judge
b. prompt presentation required, but with exceptions (e.g., delays possible for 
detainee held under security provisions)
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c. all detainees must be presented to judge within 48 hours – no exceptions
Q5. Does the law require a medical exam shortly after detention?
a. no requirement for a medical exam
b. medical exam required automatically or upon request, but under 
compromising circumstances or with exceptions (e.g., medical examiner not 
independent; security personnel present during exam; delay possible under 
security provisions)
c. prompt medical exam by objective doctor required upon request or 
automatically in all circumstances
Q6.  Does the law require that interrogations be audio or video recorded?
a. no requirement that interrogations be recorded
b. recording required, but with exceptions or only upon request (e.g., 
recording possible only if detainee pays cost; no recording if detainee held 
under security provisions)
c. all interrogations must be recorded
Q7. Is there a requirement that detention centers be monitored by cameras?
a. no CCTV monitoring requirement
b. CCTV monitoring required, but with exceptions (e.g., limited number of 
centers)
c. all  detention centers monitored by CCTV
Practice
Q8.  Is unofficial detention employed?
a. widespread unofficial detention
b. some unofficial detention
c. no unofficial detention 
Q9.  Are families or other person of choice being promptly notified of detainee’s 
detention?
a. families usually not promptly informed of detention
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b. families sometimes informed of detention
c. families almost always promptly informed of detention
Q10.  Are detainees promptly informed of their right to a lawyer?
a. detainees usually not informed of their right to a lawyer
b. detainees sometimes informed of their right to a lawyer
c. detainees almost always informed of their right to a lawyer
Q11.  Do detainees exercise their right to a lawyer?
a. detainees usually do not exercise the right to a lawyer
b. detainees sometimes exercise the right to a lawyer
c. detainees almost always exercise the right to a lawyer
Q12.  Are detainees promptly presented to a judge?
a. detainees usually not promptly presented to a judge
b. detainees sometimes presented promptly to a judge
c. detainees almost always promptly presented to a judge
Q13.  Are medical exams being given by independent doctors without security being 
present?
a. medical exams are not given or, if exams are given, are compromised (e.g., 
doctor not independent; security present during exam)
b. medical exams are provided but are often compromised (e.g. doctor not 
independent; security is present during exam)
c. medical exams are almost always given and are almost always 
uncompromised (e.g., conducted by independent doctor with no security 
present)
Q14.  Are interrogations electronically recorded and are these records provided to 
investigating authorities when requested?
a. interrogations are rarely electronically recorded
b. interrogations sometimes electronically recorded but recordings may not 
be provided
c. interrogations almost always electronically recorded, and recordings are 
almost always provided
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Q15.  Are detention center cameras used and are the films provided to investigating 
authorities when requested?
a. cameras are usually not used, or if used, usable film is rarely available as 
evidence
b. camera sometimes used, and film sometimes provided
c. cameras are often or always used, and usable films almost always provided 
Q16. Is there torture prevention training of arresting, detaining, interrogating and 
custodial personnel, as well as medical personnel charged with examining 
detainees?
a. little or no training of any personnel related to the detention process
b. some detention-related personnel receive torture prevention training
c. almost all detention-related personnel are routinely trained in torture 
prevention
Q17. Do confessions play an important role in the evidence presented in criminal cases?
a. police and prosecutors rely overwhelmingly on confession-based evidence
b. although there is some use of scientific and other techniques, confessions 
still play a prominent role 
c. confessions are only used in combination with other forms of evidence 
(e.g., scientific evidence, electronic surveillance)
Part II: PROSECUTION
Law
Q18.  Is the state a party to the CAT?
a. no
b. yes
Q19.  Is torture criminalized in the law?
a. torture not criminalized
b. torture criminalized but with definition falling short of Article 1 of CAT
c. torture criminalized with definition that complies with Article 1 of CAT
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Q20.  Is there a statute of limitations on torture (or a commensurate crime if torture is 
not used to prosecute alleged torturers)?
a. statute of limitations on torture 10 years or less
b. statute of limitations, but more than 10 years
c. no statute of limitations on torture
Q21.  Are the penalties associated with torture substantial? Or, if torture is not 
outlawed, are there other laws with commensurate penalties that are applied?
a. penalty for torture not substantial (less than 6 years)
b. penalty may be greater than 6 years but there are exceptions (e.g., defense 
of necessity or obeying orders) that lessen the severity of penalty
c. penalty is substantial (more than 6 years), and without exceptions
Q22.  Are allegations of torture/ill-treatment investigated by an independent authority?
a. there is no requirement that allegations of torture be investigated
b. allegations of torture must be investigated, but there is no requirement 
that investigation be carried out by an authority independent of the alleged 
torturer (e.g., same police force accused by detainee of torturing is charged 
with investigating detainee’s allegation of torture)  
c. investigation must be carried out by an authority other than one that is 
associated with the alleged torturer
Q23. Are statements extracted under torture admissible as evidence?
a. yes, in all instances
b. not admissible, but with some exceptions (e.g., in administrative 
proceedings; if the torture evidence originates from other countries)
c. evidence extracted under torture is inadmissible in all instances, except as 
evidence of the act of torture 
Practice
Q24.  Are complaints of torture being lodged, assuming torture is occurring?
a. complaints of torture usually not lodged
b. complaints of torture sometimes lodged
c. torture is not occurring or complaints almost always lodged
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Q25.  Are allegations of torture being thoroughly investigated?
a. allegations of torture usually not thoroughly investigated, or investigated by 
an authority that is not independent
b. allegations of torture sometimes thoroughly investigated by an 
independent authority
c. torture is not occurring or allegations of torture almost always thoroughly 
investigated by an independent authority
Q26.  Are charges of torture being brought against alleged torturers?
a. charges are usually not brought
b. charges are sometimes brought or lesser charges are brought in torture 
cases
c. torture is not occurring or torture charges are almost always brought
Q27.  Is the alleged torturer suspended from duty or otherwise removed from contact 
with the public (prior to conviction)?
a. alleged torturers usually not suspended or removed from contact with 
public
b. alleged torturers sometimes suspended or removed from contact with 
public
c. torture is not occurring or alleged torturer almost always suspended or 
removed from contact with public
Q28.  Is the rate of conviction for torture comparable to that of other crimes?
a. rate of conviction is very low compared to other crimes
b. rate of conviction is relatively low compared to other crimes
c. torture is not occurring or rate of conviction is comparable to other crimes
Q29.  Are sentences being given commensurate with the seriousness of the crime?
a. sentence is very low compared to the seriousness of the crime
b. sentence is relatively low compared to the seriousness of the crime
c. torture is not occurring or sentence is commensurate with seriousness of 
the crime
Q30.  Have civil proceeding ever been brought against the State or an alleged torturer 
seeking redress?
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a. no civil proceeding have been brought against State or alleged torturers
b. civil proceeding have been brought, at least on occasion, but have usually 
not been successful
c. torture is not occurring or civil proceedings have been brought and have 
resulted in the State or alleged torturer being found liable
Q31.  Is there torture prevention and torture investigation training of prosecutors and 
judges?
a. little or no torture prevention training given to prosecutors and judges
b. some  prosecutors and judges receive torture prevention and torture 
investigation training
c. almost all prosecutors and judges are routinely trained in torture 
prevention and torture investigation techniques
Part III: COMPLAINTS 
Law
Q32.  Are there independent complaints mechanisms for dealing with torture 
complaints (that are not associated with the detaining or interrogating 
authorities)?
a. no complaints mechanisms exist for complaints of torture
b. complaints mechanisms exist, but are limited in scope (e.g. do not cover all 
relevant agencies such as security forces) 
c. complaints mechanisms exist and are compliant with Paris Principles
Q33.  Does complaints mechanism have the power to compel the production of 
evidence and witnesses?
a. no complaints mechanisms or none of the complaints mechanisms have 
the ability to request or compel production of evidence and witnesses
b. only some of the mechanisms the ability to request evidence or compel 
production of evidence and witnesses
c. all of the relevant mechanisms have the ability to compel production of 
evidence and witnesses
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Q34.  Does the complaints mechanism have the power to refer the case to an 
investigative authority (e.g., police, prosecutorial authority)?
a. no complaints mechanisms or none of the mechanisms have the power to 
refer cases for investigation
b. only some of the mechanisms have the power to refer or require cases for 
investigation
c. all of the relevant mechanisms have the power to require an investigation
Q35.  Does the complaints mechanism have the power to recommend redress?
a. no complaints mechanisms or none of the mechanisms have the power to 
recommend redress
b. only some of the mechanism have to the power to recommend redress
c. all of the relevant mechanisms have the power to require redress 
Practice
Q36.  Is the complaints mechanism investigating torture complaints effectively?
a. no complaints mechanisms for torture complaints
b. complaints mechanism does not usually investigate torture complaints 
effectively
c. torture is not occurring or complaints mechanisms routinely investigate 
complaints thoroughly and effectively
Q37.  Does complaints mechanism refer cases to an investigative authority (e.g., police, 
prosecutorial authority)?
a. no complaints mechanism for torture; or mechanism has no power to 
refer cases; or complaints mechanism does not refer cases to investigative 
authority even though it holds this power
b. power to refer cases to investigative authority is not often exercised
c. torture is not occurring or complaints mechanism routinely refers cases to 
investigative authority
Q38.  Does the complaints mechanism make redress recommendations?
a. no complaints mechanism for torture; or mechanism has no power 
to make recommendations; or complaints mechanism does not make 
recommendations even though it holds this power
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b. power to make recommends is not often exercised
c. torture is not occurring or complaints mechanism routinely makes 
recommendations for redress
Q39.  Does the complaints mechanism publish its findings in relation to torture 
complaints?
a. no complaints mechanism for torture; or complaints mechanism does not 
publish findings
b. complaints mechanism does not often publish its findings
c. torture is not occurring or complaints mechanism routinely publishes 
findings
Q40.  Is there torture investigation training of complaints personnel?
a. little or no torture investigation training of complaints-related personnel 
b. some complaints personnel receive torture prevention and investigation 
training
c. almost all complaints personnel are routinely trained in torture prevention 
and torture investigation
DOMESTIC MONITORING 
Monitoring of Police/Gendarmerie Stations
Law
Q41.  Is the state a party to the OPCAT or some other regional or international treaty or 
agreement allowing for international monitoring visits?
a. no
b. yes
Q42.  Is there a domestic monitoring mechanism for police/gendarmerie stations 
outlined in the law?
a. no domestic monitoring mechanism for police detention facilities exists
b. domestic monitoring mechanism exists, but is not compliant with Paris 
Principles 
c. domestic monitoring mechanism exists and is compliant with Paris 
Principles (formally independent)
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Q43.  Does the monitoring mechanism have the power to make unannounced visits to 
all places of detention?
a. monitoring mechanism has no access to places of detention with prior 
notice to authorities
b. monitoring mechanism has limited access to all places of detention with 
prior notice to authorities
c. monitoring mechanism has access to all places of detention with no notice 
required
Q44.  Does the monitoring mechanism have the power to conduct interviews with 
detainees?
a. monitoring mechanism has no power to interview detainees
b. monitoring mechanism has the power to interview detainees, but with no 
guarantee of privacy
c. monitoring mechanism has power to conduct interviews with guarantee of 
privacy
Q45. Is monitoring mechanism required to produce reports on its activities and findings? 
a. monitoring mechanism is not required to report findings
b. monitoring mechanism is required to report but not publicly
c. monitoring mechanism is required to publish findings
Q46. Do monitors have immunity from sanction for their monitoring-related activities?
a. monitors have no immunity from sanction
b. monitors, or some portion of the monitors (e.g., head of the institution) 
have immunity from sanction
c. immunity from sanction for all monitors and those who communicate with 
the mechanism
Practice
Q47. Does domestic monitoring mechanism conduct regular and frequent visits?
a. no domestic monitoring mechanism for police facilities exists; or 
monitoring mechanism does not conduct visits
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b. domestic monitoring mechanism exists, but conducts irregular or 
infrequent  visits
c. domestic monitoring mechanism routinely conducts visits
Q48.  Does domestic monitoring mechanism conduct unannounced visits?
a. no domestic monitoring mechanism exists; or monitoring mechanism does 
not conduct unannounced visits
b. domestic monitoring mechanism exists, but conducts unannounced visits 
only occasionally
c. domestic monitoring mechanism routinely conducts unannounced visits
Q49.  Does the monitoring mechanism conduct interviews with detainees?
a. no domestic monitoring mechanism exists; or monitoring mechanism does 
not interview detainees
b. domestic monitoring mechanism conducts some interviews, but not 
privately
c. domestic monitoring mechanism conducts interviews in private
Q50.  Does the domestic monitoring mechanism publish its findings?
a. no domestic monitoring mechanism; monitoring mechanism does not 
publish findings
b. domestic monitoring mechanism does not often publish its findings
c. domestic monitoring mechanism routinely publishes findings
Q51.  Have domestic monitors been sanctioned for their monitoring-related activities?
a. no domestic monitoring mechanism exists; or the monitoring mechanism 
is ineffective (and therefore there is no need for sanctions or the threat of 
sanctions)
b. domestic monitoring mechanism is rendered ineffective by sanctions or 
threats of sanctions; alternatively, monitoring mechanism is effective but 
monitors are sometimes sanctioned for their activities
c. domestic monitoring mechanism is effective and monitors are not 
sanctioned for their activities
Q52. Is there torture prevention training of domestic monitoring personnel?
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a.  little or no training of domestic monitors 
b. some monitors receive torture prevention training
c. almost all monitors are routinely trained in torture prevention
Monitoring of Prisons
Law
Q53.  Is there a domestic monitoring mechanism for prison facilities outlined in the law?
a. no domestic monitoring mechanism for prison facilities exists
b. domestic monitoring mechanism exists, but is not compliant with Paris 
Principles 
c. domestic monitoring mechanism exists and is compliant with Paris 
Principles (formally independent)
Q54.  Does the monitoring mechanism have the power to make unannounced visits to 
all places of detention?
a. monitoring mechanism has no access to places of detention with prior 
notice to authorities
b. monitoring mechanism has limited access to all places of detention with 
prior notice to authorities
c. monitoring mechanism has access to all places of detention with no notice 
required
Q55.  Does the monitoring mechanism have the power to conduct interviews with 
detainees?
a. monitoring mechanism has no power to interview detainees
b. monitoring mechanism has the power to interview detainees, but with no 
guarantee of privacy
c. monitoring mechanism has power to conduct interviews with guarantee of 
privacy
Q56. Is monitoring mechanism required to produce reports on its activities and 
findings? 
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a. monitoring mechanism is not required to report findings
b. monitoring mechanism is required to report but not publicly
c. monitoring mechanism is required to publish findings
Q57. Do monitors have immunity from sanction for their monitoring-related activities?
a. monitors have no immunity from sanction
b. monitors, or some portion of the monitors (e.g., head of the institution) 
have immunity from sanction
c. immunity from sanction for all monitors and those who communicate with 
the mechanism
Practice
Q58.  Does domestic monitoring mechanism conduct regular and frequent visits?
a. no domestic monitoring mechanism for prisons exists; or monitoring 
mechanism does not conduct visits
b. domestic monitoring mechanism exists, but conducts irregular or 
infrequent  visits
c. domestic monitoring mechanism routinely conducts visits
Q59.  Does domestic monitoring mechanism conduct unannounced visits?
a. no domestic monitoring mechanism exists; or monitoring mechanism does 
not conduct unannounced visits
b. domestic monitoring mechanism exists, but conducts unannounced visits 
only occasionally
c. domestic monitoring mechanism routinely conducts unannounced visits
Q60. Does the monitoring mechanism conduct interviews with detainees?
a. no domestic monitoring mechanism exists; or monitoring mechanism does 
not interview detainees
b. domestic monitoring mechanism conducts some interviews, but not 
privately
c. domestic monitoring mechanism conducts interviews in private
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Q61.  Does the domestic monitoring mechanism publish its findings?
a. no domestic monitoring mechanism; monitoring mechanism does not 
publish findings
b. domestic monitoring mechanism does not often publish its findings
c. domestic monitoring mechanism routinely publishes findings
Q62. Have domestic monitors been sanctioned for their monitoring-related activities?
a. no domestic monitoring mechanism exists; or the monitoring mechanism 
is ineffective (and therefore there is no need for sanctions or the threat of 
sanctions)
b. domestic monitoring mechanism is rendered ineffective by sanctions or 
threats of sanctions; alternatively, monitoring mechanism is effective but 
monitors are sometimes sanctioned for their activities
c. domestic monitoring mechanism is effective and monitors are not 
sanctioned for their activities
Q63.  Is there torture prevention and torture investigation training of domestic 
monitoring personnel?
a. little or no training of domestic monitors 
b. some monitors receive torture prevention training
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